Abstract. We prove NP-hardness of equivalence and representation problems of quadratic forms under probabilistic reductions, in particular for indefinite, ternary quadratic forms with integer coefficients. We present identifications and signatures based on these hard problems. The bit complexity of signature generation and verification is quadratic using integers of bit length 150.
Introduction
The arithmetic theory of quadratic forms goes back to Fermat, Legendre, Lagrange, and Gauss. Algorithmic problems for lattices and quadratic forms have been promoted by the LLL-algorithm [14] . Recently definite forms or lattices gave rise to cryptographic protocols related to the NP-hard problems of finding a shortest or a closest lattice vector; see [15] , [20] for hardness results and [1] , [8] , [11] , [12] for applications. Cryptographic protocols based on NP-hard problems seem to withstand attacks by quantum computers. However, lattice cryptography requires lattices of high dimension. This yields long cryptographic keys and slow protocols.
By contrast, we present identification and signatures based on hard problems of quadratic forms in dimension three and four. Bounded solutions of equivalence and representation problems for indefinite ternary forms are shown to be NP-hard for probabilistic reductions. This follows from Adleman and Manders [18] who proved NPcompleteness of deciding solvability of inhomogeneous binary quadratic equations over the integers. Signature generation and verification have quadratic bit complexity for integers of bit length 150. Note that RSA has cubic bit complexity for much longer integers. Outline. Section 2 introduces computational problems of quadratic forms. Section 3 presents an identification scheme that proves knowledge of an equivalence transform for ternary anisotropic forms. It performs one LLL-reduction and a few arithmetic steps per round. Section 4 extends the identification to long challenges and signatures. Section 5 gives NP-hardness proofs. Section 6 presents polynomial time solutions for problems of isotropic forms of odd squarefree determinant. Section 7 characterizes anisotropic forms.
The equivalence problem of quadratic forms
Quadratic forms. An n-ary quadratic form (or simply form) f over Z is a homogeneous quadratic polynomial f = f A = n i,j=1 a i,j x i x j with coefficients a i,j = a j,i ∈ 1 2 Z for i = j, a i,i ∈ Z, A = (a i,j ) ∈ Z n×n . Note that f takes integer values for x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z. By definition det f = det A, dim f = n. Equivalence classes. Let f = f A be an n-ary form. For T ∈ Z n×n let f A T denote the form f T t AT . The forms f, f T are called equivalent if T ∈ GL n (Z), i.e., | det T | = 1. Obviously det(f T ) = (det T ) 2 det f = det f . We call the equivalence class of f simply the class of f . Let O(f ) = {T : f T = f, | det T | = 1} denote the group of automorphisms of f . The textbook by Cassels [3] surveys the structure of classes.
Relevant properties of forms are: f is regular if det f = 0; f is indefinite if f takes both positive and negative values. Otherwise f is either positive or negative, positive forms correspond to the Gram matrices
n , otherwise f is anisotropic. Every regular isotropic form is necessarily indefinite. The forms f = n i=1 a i x 2 i are called diagonal. We study the equivalence problem of forms f ∈ Q for various sets of forms Q.
Computational equivalence problem, CEP(Q)
GIVEN: equivalent forms f, g ∈ Q. FIND: T ∈ GL n (Z) such that g = f T .
Representations. An n-ary form f represents the integer m if there exists u ∈ Z n \{0} such that f (u) = m. The representation u is primitive if gcd(u 1 , . . . , u n ) = 1. Let CR(Q) denote the problem to find for given f ∈ Q and m ∈ Z a primitive u ∈ Z n such that f (u) = m whenever such u exists.
We show in section 5 that bounded solutions of CEP and CR are NP-hard to find for indefinite forms f of dim f = 3 and for definite forms f of dim f = 5.
LLL-reduction [14] extends from lattice bases and definite forms to indefinite forms.
There is a poly-time algorithm that transforms f into an LLL-form f T with T ∈ GL n (Z), see [13] , [25] , [27] .
The public key is f 0 , f 1 , the private key is S. The goal of the following procedure CT(f ) is to generate within (P, V) 1 forms
(t 3. LLL-reduce f T to f T T , replace T := T T , and denote CT(f ) := f T .
Step 3 balances the initially large |t i,1 | ≤ max i |t adj i,1 | < 2 2k+2 with the smaller t i,j , j = 1. The random initial t i,j , j = 1 randomize the leading and the least significant k bits of the final t i,j . Identification (P, V) 1 The prover P proves to the verifier V knowledge of S. 1. P sends as commitment the LLL-formf := f 0 T := CT(f 0 ), 2. V sends a random one-bit challenge b ∈ R {0, 1}, 3. P sends the reply R b := S b T , and V checks that f b R b =f and | det R b | = 1. Obviously, the honest prover P withstands the test f b R b =f .
Proof of knowledge. Consider a fraudulent P that sends arbitraryf ,R b . The trivial P guesses b in step 1 with probability Theorem 3.1. An arbitrary fraudulent prover P that succeeds in ( P, V) 1 with proba-
Secret key protection. We give heuristic arguments that the protocol (P, V) 1 is secure against a fraudulent verifier V, in particular that the information R b released to V does not help to compute someS ∈ O(f 1 )S.
Only P's reply R 1 = ST depends on S whereas R 0 = T is independent of S. However, f 1 andf define R 1 uniquely up to automorphisms of f 1 by the equation f 1 R 1 =f . Note that f 1 andf should be nearly independent of S since f 0 = f 1 S andf = f 1 ST are generated by CT using independent random bits. Therefore, nearly all information that ST contains about S should depend on the choice of automorphisms of f 1 , and these automorphisms must be sufficiently small. There provably exist polynomial size A ∈ O(f 1 ) [6] but their known bounds are extremely large having polynomial degree larger than 500.
The protocol (P, V) 1 would be statistical zeroknowledge if the distributions of T and ST differ negligibly. We did not yet check this out experimentally.
For further protection we can let P randomize R 1 = A 1 ST by chosing A 1 ∈ O(f 1 ) according to some random distribution; to this end it suffices to precompute generators of O(f 1 ) once and for all. If the resulting distributions of R 1 are close for varying ST , the R 1 will practically only depend onf and f 1 . We conjecture that this additional measure of protection is not necessary:
This extends to independent sequential executions of (P, V) 1 , since P generates the correspondingf := f 0 T := CT(f 0 ) using independent random bits. Since (P, V) 1 is restricted to one-bit challenges, a security level 2 100 requires 100 independent executions of (P, V) 1 and 300 rounds.
Three round identification and signatures
Our signatures correspond to identification in three rounds with long challenges, where the verifier is simulated using a hash function. This identification releases some information about the private key which we argue to be irrelevant. This information cannot be combined over several identifications, but it reduces CEP to (n − 1)-ary subforms of f 0 , f 1 . To make the reduced CEP hard we increase dim f 1 to n = 4.
Private key S ∈ GL 4 (Z), Public key anisotropic forms
Key generation. Apply a public hash function to a public / private random 100-bit seed to generate the pseudo-random bits for the construction of S via CT(f 1 ) and the pseudo-random entries
p mod 2 holds as required by Theorem 7.2). This way the public / private keys have bit lengths 10k+100 and 100, respectively. Note that CT, extended to n = 4 performs arithmetic steps on 3k-bit integers. The forms f 0 , f 1 are indefinite and so are all ternary subforms of f 0 , f 1 .
Three round identification (P, V) 2 Prover P solves problems posed by the verifier V that are hard without knowledge of S 1. P sends the LLL-formf := f 0T := CT(f 0 ) to V, 2. V computes the LLL-form f :=f T := CT(f ) and sends T to P, 3. P sends e b := S bT T e b for b = 0, 1 and
(we abbreviate T :=T T )
Note that P randomizesT to protect against a fraudulent V and V randomizes T against a fraudulent P. Importantly V does not know T =T T but only T .
Security against a fraudulent P. A successful P must find solutions e b of f b (e b ) = m for both b = 0, 1, where the randomized m :=f T e b is chosen by the verifier. The problem to find a small solution e b without the private key is NP-hard by Theorem 5.1. The fastest known method for solving f b e b =f T e b for e b is by reconstructing S.
By revealing e 1 = (
t the honest P proves bounds on i |s j,i | for j = 1, . . . , 4, S = (s i,j ). P comes close to prove a bound on |s 1,1 | as is required for the NP-hardness results of section 5. Security against a fraudulent V. Note that P reveals S if P replies to various challenges T for the samef , it suffices that V generates challenges by cyclically permuting the columns of some T . Randomization off via CT protects against this attack.
The novelty compared to (P, V) 1 is that step 3 sends information about S bT T for both b = 0, 1 by sending e b = S bT T e b for b = 0, 1. S bT T releases for a single b no relevant information about S as has been explained in section 3.
Next, we consider the following attacks that combine both replies e b : 1. recovering direct information about S from e 0 , e 1 , 2. reconstruct ST from e 1 and T from e 0 . This would reveal S.
1. The small, orthogonal vectors e 0 , e 1 are chosen so thatT T e b for b = 0, 1 are nearly statistically independent for random T =T T . This protects against the following attack. If e 1 ∈ span(e 0 ) then T e 1 ∈ span(T e 0 ) and thus e 1 ∈ span(Se 0 ). This would completely disclose S by a few identifications. This attack can be extended to the case that e 0 , e 1 are nearly parallel.
It is crucial that T e 0 , T e 1 are for T =T T nearly statistically independent (which holds for small, orthogonal e 0 , e 1 ). This makes the information released by the combination of e 0 , e 1 to V practically negligible, and completely foils the described attack. Moreover, the released information cannot be combined for several identifications as the T are generated by independent random bits.
Hardness of recovering
holds for some u ∈ Z 3 , Q ∈ GL 3 (Z), A + ∈ Z 3×3 . We rewrite (5) as
where A + is the diagonal submatrix of A 1 with diagonal (a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ). Solving equation (5) for Q ∈ GL 3 (Z) requires an unbounded solution of CEP for f A+ , f A u . Thus, releasing e 1 reduces CEP to ternary anisotropic forms and the recovering of u.
Hardness of recovering u. Equation (5) The best known attack. In order to solve CEP for f = f A+ and f = f A u it is promising to exhaust the reduced forms f A in the class of f, f by simple transforms of GL 3 (Z): permute two rows and columns of A and transform the result into an reduced form. 
Most instances of the recovering problem are subexponential for n = 3. For indefinite, binary A + , D, the multiplicative structure of the Gaussian cycle [7, art. The resulting signature (f , e 0 , e 1 ) consists of 18 k-bit integers, the entries of e 0 , e 1 ,f . Verification computes T from m, s and checks that f b e b =f T e b for b = 0, 1. The bit complexity of signature generation and verification is quadratic O(k 2 ), its main work is LLL-reduction within CT. LLL-reduction using orthogonalisation in floating point arithmetic has quadratic bit complexity using school multiplication [21] , [25] .
NP-hardness

The results
Recall that a set S ⊂ Z * , consisting of sequences of integers, is in NP if S is decidable in nondeterministic poly-time. We prove probabilistic NP-hardness of decisional variants of CEP(Q) and CR(Q) that ask for a solution x with a given bound. We first present the results and thereafter the proofs.
Decisional Bounded Representation Problem, DBR(Q)
GIVEN: f ∈ Q, m ∈ N, c ∈ N, the factorization of det f . DECIDE: whether ∃ primitive x ∈ Z n : f (x) = m and |x 1 | ≤ c.
The given factorization of det f does not decrease the worst-case complexity.
Recall that the class RP of random polynomial time consists of all sets S ⊂ Z * for which there is a probabilistic, poly-time algorithm which accepts every s ∈ S with probability ≥ 1 2 and rejects every s ∈ Z * \ S with probability 1.
Let Q ind consist of all indefinite, primitive forms f of dim f = 3.
Therefore, if DBR(Q ind ) is in RP then so is every NP-set. The proof of Theorem 5.1 reduces a Boolean form Φ in 3-CNF to a form f = 2x 2 + 2byz, where 1 2 det f ∈ Z is odd. Theorem 5.1 follows essentially from [18] . Dimension 3 is minimal for this hardness result. In fact, an algorithm of Gauß computes small representations for binary forms in subexponential time if the class number is small (see [7, For isotropic ternary forms of odd squarefree determinant unbounded solutions of CEP and CR can be found in poly-time given an isotropic vector. For anisotropic forms, by contrast, CEP, CR seem to be hard on average. Representation problems for definite forms are by Theorem 5.2 harder than equivalence problems. In fact, equivalence transformations of definite forms can be efficiently computed in constant dimension by computing shortest lattice vectors [22] , [23] .
Incomplete forms. If some coefficients a i,j of A are undefined, a i,j = * , and if det A does not depend on the undefined a i,j then we call f A incomplete. For example the form f = ax 2 + bxy + 2a 1,3 xz + z 2 is incomplete for a 1,3 = * . A completion of f A defines the undefined a i,j of A.
Decisional Bounded Equivalence Problem, DBE(Q)
GIVEN:
f, g ∈ Q, c ∈ N, the factorization of det f . DECIDE: whether ∃T ∈ GL n (Z): f T = g, |t 1,1 | ≤ c. DBE(Q) for given n-ary incomplete forms f, g ∈ Q asks for the existence of T ∈ GL n (Z) and completionsf ,ḡ of f, g such thatf T =ḡ, |T 1,1 | ≤ c. Let Q inin extend the set Q ind by all incomplete, indefinite forms f of dim f = 3.
Extensions. 1. The NP-hardness of Theorem 5.1 extends to all dimensions n ≥ 3. 2. The proof of Theorem 5.1 can be extended from isotropic to anisotropic forms (that are used for identification and signatures). However, this requires a considerable amount of number theory and the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics for class numbers of real quadratic fields, see [10] , [9] . The main problem is to show that all values x 2 + by are covered by the anisotropic forms x 2 + b(y 2 + z 2 ) for a few b. 3. At the end of this section we sketch how extend Theorem 5.3 from Q inin to Q ind . 4. The problem DBR(Q df ) is NP-complete in dimension ≥ 5 even if the condition that |x 1 | ≤ c is removed. This holds because the problem to decide whether ax 2 + by = c has a solution x, y ∈ N is NP-hard [18] , [9] .
From SAT to squares
The following problem on binary Diophantine equations will be used as an intermediary problem for reductions.
Modular Square Problem, MS
GIVEN: a, b, c ∈ N such that b = p m+1 b ; a, p prime, b squarefree, p ≥ 5. DECIDE: ∃x ∈ Z: x 2 ≡ a mod b and |x| ≤ c.
Let r denote that there is a probabilistic, poly-time Karp reduction, and let 3SAT be the problem to decide satisfiability of Boolean forms in 3-CNF. Proposition 5.4 is similar to a result of Adleman and Manders [18] .
Proof. We transform a given Boolean form Φ in 3-CNF into an instance (a, b, c) of MS that is solvable if and only if Φ is satisfiable. Let Φ contain each clause at most once, and let no clause of Φ contain a variable both complemented and uncomplemented. Let be the number of variables in Φ. Choose an enumeration σ 1 , . . . , σ m of all such clauses in the variables x 1 , . . . , x with exactly three literals such that the bijection i → σ i and its inverse are poly-time. We write σ ∈ Φ if σ occurs in Φ, and x j ∈ σ (x j ∈ σ) if the j-th variable occurs uncomplemented (complemented) in clause σ. Let n = 2m + . Let r = (r 1 , . . . , r ) ∈ {0, 1} denote Boolean values for x 1 , . . . , x , where 1 corresponds to true and 0 corresponds to false. For a clause σ and r ∈ {0, 1} define W (σ, r) = i:xi∈σ r i + i:xi∈σ (1 − r i ).
Introducing new variables y 1 , . . . , y m we set for k = 1, . . . , m
Since Φ is in 3-CNF, we have W (σ k , r) = 0 if assignment r does not satisfy clause σ k , and 1 ≤ W (σ k , r) ≤ 3 otherwise. Hence the equations R 1 = · · · = R m = 0 have a solution r ∈ {0, 1} , y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} m if and only if Φ is satisfiable.
We select a prime p ≥ 5. As −3 ≤ R k ≤ 4 for all choices of y k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, r i ∈ {0, 1}, the equations R 1 = · · · = R m = 0 holds if and only if
holds for p ≥ 5 and p is odd. We now add α 0 + 1 to the left hand side of (5.1), where α 0 is considered a variable taking values in {1, −1}. Hence (5.1) is solvable if and only if
for y k , r i , α 0 ranging over their respective domains. Moreover, if (5.2) is solvable, then necessarily α 0 = −1 by reduction modulo p. We express y 1 , . . . , y m and r 1 , . . . , r in (5.2) by new variables α 1 , . . . , α n , n = 2m + ranging over {1, −1}, we set
Exactly all combinations of y k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, r i ∈ {0, 1} are covered by α 1 , . . . , α n . We can rewrite (5.2) via (5.3) into
for some c j , τ ∈ Z.We see that Φ is satisfiable if and only if (5.4) is solvable for α ∈ {−1, 1} n+1 . Note that p |τ , as the constant part of (5.2) equals 1.
We select a prime p 0 > 4 · p m+1 (n + 1) and primes p 0 < p 1 < . . . < p n that are of polynomial size in p m . For j = 1, . . . , n compute θ j via the Chinese Remainder Theorem to be the smallest positive integer satisfying
We see that Φ is satisfiable if and only if Proof.
and thus either p j |c − x or p j |c + x holds for every j = 0, . . . , n. This disjunction is exclusive: if p j |c − x and p j |c + x then p j |2c, and thus p j |c. This contradicts the fact that c ≡ θ j ≡ 0 mod p j . Since p j divides exactly one of c ± x we define α j ∈ {±1} such that p j |c − α j x, hence x ≡ α j c mod p j . Setting x := n i=0 α i θ i yields x ≡ x mod p j for all j, and thus x ≡ x mod K.
We see from |x | ≤ 
Hence c = n j=0 θ j < K/2. We see from |x − x | ≤ 2c that |x − x | < K, and from x ≡ x mod K that x and x coincide. This proves the lemma. Combining (5.5) with Lemma 5.5 we see that Φ is satisfiable if and only if there exists x ∈ Z, |x| ≤ c such that
These equations are equivalent to each of the following equations
Since p |K the latter equation can be written as
Then (5.6) has a solution x ∈ Z with |x| ≤ c if and only if Φ is satisfiable. We can select a prime a in the arithmetic progression (5.7) in random poly-time. Clearly K is odd and squarefree, and the prime a is coprime to b. Then (a, b, c) is a solvable instance of MS if and only if Φ is satisfiable.
Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let Φ be a boolean formula in 3-CNF. NP-hardness of DBE(Q ind ). We sketch how to extend the proof of Theorem 5.3 to reduce to complete forms in Q ind , for more details see [9] . We construct for f = x 2 + byz a list of forms f 1 , . . . , f N such that every solution (x, y, z) of a = x 2 + byz, |x| ≤ c provides a first column of some S ∈ GL 3 (Z) satisfying f S = f j for some f j . Hence (a, b, c) is solvable for MS if and only if (f, f j , c) is for some 1 ≤ j ≤ N solvable for DBE. This proves the desired reduction. We construct the f j to represent all orbits of primitive representations of a by f under O(f ). Zhuravlev [28, sec. 1.2] classifies these orbits in terms of modular matrix equations. We construct the f j by solving these equations. First we determine the genus of f j , i.e., the f j up to simultaneous equivalence over the reals R and over all rings of p-adic integers. Then we construct the actual f j by a constructive version of the classical proof of the existence of genera [3, sec. 9.5] . According to MS, the integer a is prime, and this ensures that N = O(1). Moreover, the construction is poly-time per entry f j , given the factorization of ab.
Solving quadratic equations using an isotropic vector
Isotropic forms f A are universal over any field F, i.e., for A ∈ F n×n the equation
We show that f A (x) = m can easily be solved for all m ∈ Z over the integers if an isotropic vector is given and det A is odd and squarefree. Theorem 6.1 transforms an isotropic form f A with odd, squarefree determinant d = det A into the form 2xy − dz 2 and Theorem 6.2 solves the equation 2xy − dz 2 = m. Importantly, Simon [26] , [27] has shown that an isotropic vector can be found in poly-time for any isotropic form f given the factorization of det f . Theorem 6.1. Let f A be an isotropic, ternary form and let d := det A be odd and squarefree. Given an isotropic vector (x , y , z ) the form f A can be transformed in poly-time into the equivalent form 2xy − dz 2 .
As d = −r 2 h and d is squarefree we have r = ±1. So let r = 1, h = −d, and thus
where e = g − 2 g/2 ∈ {0, 1}. So far we have transformed f A into 2xy + ey 2 − dz 2 . We are finished if e = 0. Case e = 1. We transform 2xy + y 2 − dz 2 into 2xy − dz 2 . As d is odd let −d = 1 + 2k. Transforming 2xy + y 2 − dz 2 via x :=x + ky − dz yields 2xy + 2ky 2 + y 2 − 2dyz − dz 2 = 2xy − dy 2 − 2dyz − dz 2 = 2xy − d(y + z) 2 . Settingz := y + z yields 2xy − dz 2 . Extensions. Ternary isotropic forms f A of odd, squarefree det A are equivalent if and only if they coincide in det A. Moreover, CEP for such f A can be solved in poly-time by Theorem 6.1. In particular, such f A is equivalent to 2xy − det A z 2 by Theorem 6.1. However, f A can be inequivalent to 2xy − det A z 2 for even det A. For example, the forms ax 2 + by 2 − cz 2 and 2xy + abcz 2 can be inequivalent for even abc because only the second form is a multiple of 2 unless a, b, c are all even.
The equation 2xy − dz 2 = m is unsolvable for even d and odd m. However, all solvable instances of f A (x) = m for even, squarefree d = det A can easily be solved given an isotropic vector.
Even when d = det A is not squarefree the equation f A (x) = m can in practice be solved by the method of Theorems 6.1, 6.2. It is unlikely that a large squarefactor r 2 = 1 shows up in the algorithm of Theorem 6.1.
The set of all solutions. We get all solutions (x, y, z) ∈ Z 3 of 2xy − dz 2 = m by extending the solutions of Theorem 6.2 in that we allow to permute x and y and to change the signs of x, y, z. In fact, we easily get all solutions of 2xy − dz 2 = 0 given the factorization of d.
Moreover, when we replace Z by a finite field, a finite ring or the field of real numbers then solving the equation f A (x) = m is relatively easy for m = 0. Solutions over the ring Z N , N composite, can be found using Pollard's algorithm [24] .
Characterization of isotropic and anisotropic indefinite forms
For fixed n, every n-ary form f over Z can be transformed in poly-time into a diagonal form f T =
i , where a 0 , . . . , a n ∈ Z and T ∈ Q n×n , det T = 1. Then f is isotropic if and only if f is isotropic. Next we characterize isotropic diagonal forms. The form ax 2 + by 2 − cz 2 is isotropic if and only if the Legendre equation is solvable. The equation (7.1) is in normal form if a, b, c ∈ N are positive, squarefree and pairwise coprime. Let QR a denote the set of quadratic residues modulo a.
Theorem 7.1 (see [17] , [4] ). In normal form the equation (7.1) has a non-zero solution if and only if bc ∈ QR a , ac ∈ QR b and −ab ∈ QR c , and solving (7.1) for given a, b, c is poly-time equivalent to each of the following problems : 1. solve α 2 = bc mod a, β 2 = ac mod b and γ 2 = −ab mod c, 2. solve equation (7.1) for a non-zero (x, y, z) ∈ Z 3 such that x 2 + y 2 + z 2 ≤ 2abc. The Hilbert Norm Residue Symbol (a i , a j ) p ∈ {±1} equals 1 if and only if a i x 2 + a j y 2 − z 2 is isotropic over Q p , the field of p-adic numbers. In particular (a i , a j ) p is poly-time, and anisotropy of f is poly-time given the factorization of det f [3, chap. 3.2]. For n ≥ 5 every indefinite n-ary form f is isotropic [19] . Anisotropic quaternary forms f have a square-factor dividing det f .
